Abstract. We study a Dynkin game with asymmetric information. The game has a random expiry time, which is exponentially distributed and independent of the underlying process. The players have asymmetric information on the expiry time, namely only one of the players is able to observe its occurrence. We propose a set of conditions under which we solve the saddle point equilibrium and study the implications of the information asymmetry. Results are illustrated with an explicit example.
Introduction
Dynkin games are game variants of optimal stopping problems, for the seminal study see [6] . Such a game has two players, "buyer" and "issuer", and both of them can stop the underlying process prior the terminal time. In this paper we study the following formulation of the game. First, we assume that the underlying process X is a time homogenous diffusion; we will elaborate the assumptions on X in the next section. At the initial time t = 0, the players choose their own stopping times τ (buyer) and γ (issuer) and at the time of the first exercise, i.e. at τ ∧ γ, the issuer pays the buyer the amount (1.1) g 1 (X τ )1 {τ <γ} + g 2 (X γ )1 {τ >γ} + g 3 (X γ )1 {τ =γ} ;
we will pose assumptions on the payoff functions g i in the next section. An interpretation of this is that, at any stopping time γ, the issuer can cancel the buyer's right to exercise, but she has to pay the cost g 2 (X γ ) to do so. Now, it is the buyers (issuers) objective to choose the stopping time τ (γ) such that the expected present value of the exercise payoff (1.2) Π(x, τ, γ) = E x e −r(τ ∧γ) g 1 (X τ )1 {τ <γ} + g 2 (X γ )1 {τ >γ} + g 3 (X γ )1 {τ =γ} is maximized (minimized). Here, r > 0 is the constant rate of discounting.
The objective of this paper is to study a version of this game with random time horizon, the infinite horizon game given by the expression (1.2) being already analysed comprehensively e.g. in [1] and [8] . In financial terminology the random time horizon game can be interpreted as a perpetual game option with default risk, for studies on game options see e.g. [7] , [12] and [13] . We remark that our problem can be regarded also as a Canadized version of a finite horizon game -for studies considering Canadization of options, see [4] , [13] and [14] . To introduce the random time horizon, we assume that, in addition to the diffusion X, there is also an independent Poisson process N defined on the underlying probability space. Furthermore, we assume that the game expires at the first jump time of the Poisson process, that is we assume that the game has an exponentially distributed random time horizon. The existence of the terminating event and its rate is assumed to be known to the players, while the information of it is asymmetric: we assume that the occurrence of the expiring event is observable only to one of the players. Here, the information asymmetry has an interpretation as inside information. Indeed, the player who observes the default taking place has more information than is commonly available on the market and can be considered as an insider. We make a distinction between the cases when either buyer (Game 1) or issuer (Game 2) observes the jump of the Poisson process and study both of these cases separately.
Our approach to the problem is built on Markovian approach to Dynkin games. There is a substantial literature in this area highlighting various parts of the theory. For instance, studies [1] and [2] are concerned with deriving explicit characterization for the value and saddle point equilibrium using classical theory of diffusions and standard nonlinear programming techniques. A generalized concavity approach is used in [7] and [8] to produce the optimal solution via the theory of excessive functions. In [9] and [17] , the authors study equilibrium properties of Dynkin games under very general Markovian setup. Our setup and approach is closely related to [1] and can be regarded as a partial extension of it. We start our analysis by first deriving partly heuristically a free boundary problem which gives us a candidate for the solution. To set up the free boundary problem, we assume that the optimal continuation region is an interval with compact closure with constant thresholds. Given the time homogeneity of the diffusion X and the fact that the discount rate r and the jump rate of N are constants, this is indeed a reasonable assumption.
We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for Games 1 and 2. We also carry out a comparison of the solutions showing that whenever Games 1 and 2 have a saddle point solution, the value of Game 1 dominates the value of Game 2. Furthermore, we show that if the payoff g 2 is non-negative, the value of the infinite horizon game dominates both the value of Game 1 and 2.
Interestingly, we find that if g 2 admits also negative values, then the value of the infinite horizon game can even be the smallest of the three. We discuss also the symmetric information case where the expiring event is not observable to either of the players -denote this as Game 3. In this case, we find that the value is in
between the values of Game 1 and Game 2. We also show that the optimal continuation regions of Games 1 -3 are related in a way that can be described as follows: If you are able to observe the terminating event,
you will wait longer -The more you know, the longer you wait.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the underlying dynamics and introduce the Dynkin games. In Sections 3 and 4 we study the solvability of the games and discuss some implications of the information asymmetry. In Section 5 we compare the optimal solutions of the games and study limiting behavior of the solutions. In Section 6 we illustrate the main results of the study with an explicit example.
The Games
2.1. Underlying Dynamics. Let (Ω, F , F, P), with F = {F t } t≥0 , be a complete filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions, see [3] , p. 2. In addition, let W be a Wiener process on (Ω, F , F, P). We assume that the state process X is a regular linear diffusion defined on (Ω, F , F, P), evolving on R + , and
given as the solution of the Itô equation
where the coefficients µ : R + → R and σ : R + → R + are assumed to be sufficiently smooth to guarantee the existence of a unique (weak) solution of (2.1), see [3] , pp. 46 -47. In line with most economical and financial applications, we assume that X does not die inside the state space R + , i.e., that killing of X is possible only at the boundaries 0 and ∞. Therefore the boundaries 0 and ∞ are either natural, entrance, exit or regular.
In the case a boundary is regular, it is assumed to be killing, see [3] , pp. 18-20, for a characterization of the boundary behavior of diffusions. The assumption that the state space is R + is done for reasons of notational convenience. In fact, we could assume that the state space is any interval I in R and all our subsequent analysis would hold with obvious modifications. Denote as A =
dx the differential operator associated to the process X. For notational convenience we denote G β = A − β for a given constant β > 0.
For any given constant β > 0, we denote as L β 1 the class of real valued measurable functions f on R + satisfying the condition
where ζ := inf{t > 0 : X t / ∈ R + } denotes the lifetime of X. In addition, for any given constant β > 0, we denote, respectively, as ψ β and ϕ β the increasing and the decreasing solution of the ordinary second-order linear differential equation G β u(x) = 0 defined on the domain of the characteristic operator of X -for the characterization and fundamental properties of the minimal β-excessive functions ψ β and ϕ β , see [3] , pp.
18-20. Denote as
S ′ (x) ψ β (x) the Wronskian determinant, where
denotes the density of the scale function of X, see [3] , p. 19. We remark that the value of the Wronskian does not depend on the initial state x but on the constant β.
for all x ∈ R + . The resolvent R β and the solutions ψ β and ϕ β are connected in a computationally very useful way. Indeed, we know from the literature, see [3] , pp. 17 -20 and p. 29, that for given f ∈ L β 1 the resolvent R β f can be expressed as
denotes the speed density of X. To close the subsection, we denote as N a Poisson process with intensity λ > 0, and assume that N is independent of the underlying X. Now, the first jump time T of N is an exponentially distributed random time with mean 1 λ . Denote asF = F t t≥0 the enlarged filtration defined asF t = F t ∨ σ({T ≤ s} : s ≤ t).
In other words, the filtrationF carries the information of the evolution of underlying X and the first jump of the Poisson process N . We denote as T 0 as the set of all F-stopping times and as T 1 the set T 0 augmented with T , i.e., the set of allF-stopping times.
2.2. The Games. Dynkin game is an optimal stopping game between two players, "buyer" and "issuer". In contrast to classical optimal stopping problems, also the issuer can now exercise. Recall now the definition of the expected present value of the exercise payoff from (1.2). Throughout the study, we make the following standing assumptions for the payoffs g i . Assumption 2.1. We assume that the payoffs g i : R + → R, i = 1, 2, 3, are continuous and non-decreasing functions satisfying the ordering g 1 ≤ g 3 ≤ g 2 and that g 1 is bounded from below. Furthermore, we assume
, where the set D is finite.
In order to propose a value and notions of equilibrium for the considered games, define first the lower and upper values V and V as
where T is the class of admissible stopping times. Following [8] , pp. 1578, we remark that
If, on the other hand, the values satisfy V ≥ V , we say that the game has the value V := V = V , i.e. has a Stackelberg equilibrium. Moreover, if there exists stopping times τ * and γ * such that
for all x ∈ R + , then the pair (τ * , γ * ) constitutes the saddle point, i.e., the Nash equilibrium of the game.
We remark that the existence of the saddle point implies the existence of the value but the converse does not hold in general -for a study addressing this problem in a general Markovian setting, see [9] . However, in our setting the underlying process is nice enough so that Stackelberg equilibrium is equivalent to Nash equilibrium.
The main objective of this paper is to study two Dynkin games which are associated via a certain type of information asymmetry. To make a precise statement, recall the Poisson process N from the previous section.
At the initial time t = 0, the underlying X and exogenous N are both started. At the first jump time T , the game ends. Thus, the considered games have an exponentially distributed random time horizon which is independent of X. The information asymmetry is introduced as follows: we assume that the occurrence of the expiring event is observable only to one of the players. Let us formalize this setting first in the case when T is observable to the buyer ; later this case will be referred to as Game 1. First, recall the definitions of the sets T 0 and T 1 from the previous subsection. At the start of the game, issuer choose a stopping time from set T 0 and the buyer from the set T 1 . The expected present value Π 1 of the exercise payoff is written as
and the upper and lower values are defined as
For Game 1, we denote the value function as V 1 and the saddle point equilibrium as (τ * 1 , γ * 1 ).
The setup of the second game, which will be referred to as Game 2, is completely analogous. For Game 2, we assume that the random time T is a stopping time to issuer. Similarly to Game 1, we define the expected present value Π 2 of the exercise payoff as
Analogously to Game 1, the value function of Game 2 is denoted as V 2 and the saddle point equilibrium as
3. Game 1 3.1. Equivalent formulation of the game. First, we introduce some additional definitions and notations.
Following [1] (see also [19] ), define the operators L 
for a given constant β > 0. In order to simplify the upcoming notation, define the functionsĝ i : R + → R,
where g + 1 (x) = max{g 1 (x), 0}. We remark that since we assumed g 1 ≤ g 2 , alsoĝ 1 ≤ĝ 2 .
In this subsection, we transform Game 1 into an adjusted perpetual game and study its solvability. To this end, we derive first a candidate G 1 for the optimal value function in a partly heuristic way -for a related study in a different context, see [10] . We start with the ansatz that the game has a saddle point equilibrium.
Because the exponential distribution has memoryless property and the underlying dynamic structure is time this suggests with a heuristic use of Dynkin's theorem, see e.g. [16] , that
for all x ∈ (z * 1 , y * 1 ) under the intuition dt 2 = 0. This yields the condition
for all x ∈ (z * 1 , y * 1 ). The solutions of the equation (3.3) can be expressed as
for some positive constants c 1 and c 2 . We assume that the candidate G 1 satisfies the value-matching condition, i.e., is continuous over the boundary of (z * 1 , y * 1 ). This condition can be expressed
Using the notation from (3.2), it is a matter of elementary algebra to show that
To proceed, denote as τ (z * 1 ,y * 1 ) the first exit time of X from the interval (z * 1 , y * 1 ). We know from [5] , Theorem
solves the boundary value problem G r+λ u(x) = 0 on (z * 1 , y * 1 ) with boundary conditions u(z * 1 ) = u(y * 1 ) = 1. Using this, we find that
,
, see also [15] . Consequently, the candidate G 1 can be rewritten as
for all x ∈ (z * 1 , y * 1 ). Since the sample paths of X are (almost surely) continuous, an application of the strong Markov property of the underlying X yields
for all x ∈ R + . This result indicates the form of the equivalent perpetual game. The next proposition confirms that this partly heuristic derivation gives the correct form of the adjusted perpetual problem. For a rigorous proof we though need an auxiliary lemma.
Proof. See [18] , Lemma, Section VI.3, p. 378.
Proposition 3.2. The upper and lower values for Game 1 can be rewritten as
Proof. LetT 1 denote the set containingF-stopping times satisfying τ ≤ T for all ω. We know that for all τ ∈T 1 , there is a τ ′ ∈ T 1 for which τ ′ = τ ∧ T . Because buyer's objective is to maximize the expected present value of the payoff and she is aware that after the observable expiry time T the payoff will be zero, we reason that
Now, it follows from Lemma 3.1 that the last expression is equivalent with the form
Finally, let τ, γ ∈ T 0 . Since T is independent of X, we conclude that
for all x ∈ R + . This computation proves the claimed result for the lower value V 1 . The result for the upper value V 1 is proved completely similarly.
In Proposition 3.2 we showed that the random horizon game can be transformed into an equivalent adjusted perpetual game. Moreover, we observe that the form the value function (3.6) associated with constant threshold policy is consistent with Proposition 3.2. It is also worth mentioning that the buyer follows actually a stopping rule "Stop at time τ ∧ T " which results into the payoff
This property was used in (3.7).
3.2. Necessary Conditions. Having the expression (3.6) at hand, we proceed with the derivation of necessary conditions. Define the function Q 1 :
recall the definition of the functionsĝ i and h i , i = 1, 2, from (3.2) and (3.4), respectively (see [1] , expression (15) ). Function Q 1 is the value function associated to the strategy constituted by the first hitting times τ y and γ z to arbitrary boundaries y and z satisfying z < y. We assume now that the thresholds z * 1 and y * 1 give rise to an extremal expression for Q 1 in the sense that for all fixed (initial) state x, the point (z * 1 , y * 1 ) is a saddle point for the surface (z, y) → Q 1 (x, z, y). In other words, given the family of surfaces (z, y) → Q 1 (x, z, y),
indexed by the initial states x, we assume that the point (z * 1 , y * 1 ) is saddle point for all of these surfaces. To determine first order necessary conditions for the saddle point, denote as x o the unique point satisfying the
Using the notation from (3.1), we find after differentiation and some elementary manipulations that the conditions (3.8) can be rewritten as
Following [1] , Lemma 4.1, we readily verify that the conditions (3.9) can be expressed as
Denote now the candidate
Finally, the r-harmonicity of the candidate G 1 on the continuation region (z * 1 , y * 1 ) implies that the necessary conditions (3.8) can be rewritten as
The next proposition contains our main result on the necessary conditions for the optimal solution for Game 1.
Proposition 3.3. Assume that there is a pair (z * 1 , y * 1 ) satisfying the conditions (3.12) and that there exist
Then the pair (z * 1 , y * 1 ) is unique and z * 1 <x 2 andx 1 < y * 1 . Moreover the value of Game 1 reads as
Proof. We know from [1] , Theorem 4.3 that under assumption (3.13) a pair satisfying (3.12) is necessary unique and that z * 1 <x 2 andx 1 < y * 1 . To prove that the value of the game reads as (3.11), we follow the lines of the proof of Theorem 4.3 in [1] . First, assume that x ∈ (z * 1 , y * 1 ) and define the functionals
The saddle point condition (3.8) implies that the candidate G 1 is once continuously differentiable in R + and,
. By standard differentiation we find that d dx
which imply together with (3.10) that d dx
(3.14)
To see that the inequalities in (3.14) hold, we observe first using (3.10) that
Moreover, since 0 < z * 1 <x 2 andx 1 < y * 1 < ∞, wherex 2 andx 1 are given in (3.13), and x ∈ (z * 1 , y * 1 ), the examination of the derivatives of the integrals reveals that the inequalities in (3.14) hold.
To conclude, we observe first that the condition (3.14) implies that
. Similarly we find that ∆ 2 (x) ≤ 0 for all and y * 1 give rise to a unique saddle point strategy and the value V 1 (x) = G 1 (x) for all x ∈ R + .
In Proposition 3.3 we showed that given the additional condition (3.13), a solution of the pair (3.12)
is necessarily unique. From a practical point of view this is a convenient result. Indeed, if we attempt to solve the pair (3.12) numerically for a particular example and our scheme converges to a solution, we can be sure that it is the unique optimal one. The condition (3.13) was needed in the proof of Proposition 3.3 to assure that functionals L r+λ ·ĝi behave nicely enough for the uniqueness result to hold -remember that
We propose in the next lemma a set of sufficient conditions for the assumption (3.13).
Lemma 3.4. Assume that there are thresholdsx i , i = 1, 2, such that
In addition, assume that
• g 1 (x) ≥ 0 for all x > 0 or that G r g 1 is non-increasing, and
Then the condition (3.13) holds.
Proof. The result follows from the expressions G r+λĝ1 = G r g 1 + λ(g
We note also from Proposition 3.3 that the stopping times τ y *
1
and γ z * 1 do not tell the entire story about the optimal stopping rules. Indeed, the optimal stopping rule for the issuer is "stop at time
, stop at time T whenever g 1 (X T ) > 0" so that the optimal rule for the buyer is not pure threshold rule.
While In the next result we propose a set of necessary conditions for a class of problems of this kind.
Corollary 3.5. Assume that there existsx i <x i so that
, and
Assume also that the threshold
) satisfying the first order conditions (3.12), then the conclusion of Proposition 3.3 are satisfied and the value of the game reads as in (3.11).
Proof. The result follows from Proposition 3.3 after noticing thatŷ * x2 is the corner solution to the lower equation of (3.9).
If there does not exist an internal solution, then the pair (x 2 ,ŷ * x2 ) constitutes a corner solution, which is the saddle point solution and the solution reads as
3.3. Sufficient Conditions. The main objective of this section is to propose a set of sufficient conditions for the solvability of the game. To this end, we prove first the following lemma. ψr(x) is monotonically increasing.
Proof. Let x < b < ∞. From [3] , p. 18, we have
From this we also see that ψ r+λ ψr is monotonically increasing.
The next theorem, which is the main result of this subsection, gives a set of conditions under which the optimal solution for Game 1 is given by (3.12) and (3.11).
Theorem 3.7. Assume that the boundaries 0 and ∞ are natural for the underlying X, that condition (3.13) holds, and that for i = 1, 2,
Then there exist a unique pair (z * 1 , y * 1 ) satisfying the first order conditions (3.12) and the value V 1 of Game 1 reads as in (3.11).
Proof. First, we find by coupling the assumption (3) with the inequality g 2 ≥ g 1 that
for all x ∈ R + \ D. Furthermore, since the functions g i ∈ L r 1 , the assumption (1) implies that
, for i = 1, 2. Our next objective is to show that
To this end, let b ∈ R + . Since the function
is decreasing, see Lemma 3.6, we find
= 0, for i = 1, 2. Here, the last inequality follows from the assumption (2) and Proposition 4 from [11] . By coupling (3.18) with (2.1) and (3.16), we find that 11) . We remark that these conditions do not depend on the jump rate λ. Furthermore, we know from Lemma 3.4 that the condition (3.13) can be substituted with a set of conditions that are also independent of λ. Thus, when using our results to check whether a particular example of Game 1 has a (unique) solution, the value of λ does not play any role.
Game 2

Equivalent formulation of the game. This section is devoted to the study of the solvability of Game
2. The analysis is completely analogous to the Section 3. Again, we begin with the ansatz that the game has a saddle point equilibrium and that the continuation region (z * 2 , y * 2 ) ⊂ R + has compact closure. Now, because the terminal date T is observable to the issuer and she knows that after that time the buyer cannot exercise, it is clear that she will exercise at time T if and only if g 2 (X T ) < 0. Thus, in an infinitesimal time interval dt, the Poisson process jumps with probability λdt leaving the buyer with payoff g − 2 (x) = min{g 2 (x), 0}. With probability 1 − λdt there is no jump which results in additional expected present value. Analogously to Game 1, we deduce that the candidate G 2 must satisfy the condition G r+λ G 2 (x) = −λg − 2 (x) for all x ∈ (z * 2 , y * 2 ) and, consequently, the candidate can be represented as (4.1)
for all x ∈ R + . As in Game 1, this form is the correct form of the value function for the associated perpetual game.
Proposition 4.1. The upper and lower values can for Game 2 be rewritten as
for all x ∈ R + .
Proof. Completely similar to the proof of Proposition 3.2.
Similarly to Game 1, we remark that the issuer follows now a stopping rule "Stop at time γ ∧ T " which results into the payoff
4.2. Necessary conditions. In order to simplify the notations, we denote
Moreover define the function Q 2 :
where the functions
.
Analogously to Section 3, we assume that for every fixed x, the (z, y) → Q 2 (x, z, y) has a unique saddle point (z * 2 , y * 2 ), which does note depend on x. Then the first order necessary conditions for this saddle point can be written as
The next proposition contains our main result on the necessary conditions for the optimal solution for Game 2. 
where the functions k i , i = 1, 2, are defined in (4.3).
Proof. Completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.3.
Similarly to Proposition 3. Proof. Proof is similar to that of Corollary 3.5.
If there does not exist an internal solution, then the pair (x 2 ,y * x2 ) constitutes a corner solution, which is the saddle point solution and the solution reads as
4.3. Sufficient conditions. The next theorem contains a set of sufficient conditions for the optimal solution for Game 2. Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 3.7.
Theorem 4.5 states sufficient conditions under which an optimal pair (z * 2 , y * 2 ) uniquely exists and under which the value of Game 2 can be expressed as in (4.6). Using Lemma 4.3 the condition (4.5) can be expressed independent of λ. Therefore, similar to Game 1, we remark that with a particular example, the conditions of the theorem can be checked without any reference to the jump rate λ.
Comparison and asymptotics
In the previous sections we studied the solvability of Games 1 and 2. In particular, we derived necessary and sufficient conditions for the solutions to be given by (3.11) and (4.6). In this section, we study further the properties of these solutions. In particular, we are interested in finding orderings of the stopping thresholds and the value functions. Furthermore, we study the asymptotic behavior of the optimal characteristics with respect to jump rate λ. To this end, we define two more Dynkin games. First of these is the infinite horizon Dynkin game, which is defined using (1.2) and (2.3) in the absence of terminating event taking place at time T . For a comprehensive analysis of this game, see [1] . Denote the value of this game as V and the optimal exercise thresholds as (z * , y * ). The second additional game is the game with random time horizon in the case where the terminating event is not observable to either of the players -we refer to this game as Game 3. The upper and lower values of Game 3 are inf γ∈T0 sup τ ∈T0Π3 (x, τ, γ) and sup τ ∈T0 inf γ∈T0Π3 (x, τ, γ) respectively,
In fact, Game 3 is an infinite horizon game with discount rate r + λ. Hence we know from [1] that under certain assumptions this game has a Nash equilibrium given by the unique thresholds (z * 3 , y * 3 ). We denote the value of this game as V 3 . It is worth pointing out that Proposition 3.2 implies that if the function g 1 is nonpositive, the value of Game 1 coincides with the value of Game 3. Similarly, Proposition 4.1 implies that if the function g 2 is nonnegative, the value of Game 2 coincides with the value of Game 3.
Ordering of the thresholds and the values.
The following proposition is our main result on the ordering of optimal characteristics of the games. 
•
(B) If in addition the infinite horizon game has a unique saddle point solution and g 2 is non-negative, then
Proof. (A) Let us first prove the orderings between Game 1 and Game 2. Recall the definitions ofΠ 1 (x, τ, γ)
andΠ 2 (x, τ, γ) from Propositions 3.2 and 4.1 respectively. Now
for all x ∈ R + and τ, γ ∈ T 0 . Thus
Suppose now, contrary to our claim, that y * 1 < y * 2 and let x ∈ (y * 1 , y * 2 ) so that x is in the continuation region of Game 1, and in the stopping region of Game 2. Then V 1 (x) = g 1 (x) < V 2 (x), contrary to (5.1). The same reasoning applies to the case z We see thatΠ 1 ≥Π 3 ≥Π 2 and using reasoning as above we find that V 1 ≥ V 3 ≥ V 2 . The claimed inequalities for the thresholds follows as above.
(B) Let g 2 be non-negative and recall the definition of Π(x, τ, γ) from (1.2). We shall compare it to Π 1 from (2.4). We know that the value function satisfies V (x) = sup τ ∈T0 inf γ∈T0 Π(x, τ, γ) and similarly
the last term being zero due to non-negativeness of g 2 . For the first term on the right hand side we get
and again due to non-negativeness of g 2 for the second term we get the inequality
Substituting these to (5.2) we get
the first equality being true, since in the maximization we have two disjoint sets for whichT 1 ∪T c 1 = T 1 and the last equality follows from the fact that T 1 = T 0 in the absence of terminating event.
Suppose, contrary to our claim, that y * < y * 1 and let x ∈ (y * , y * 1 ), so that x is in the continuation region of stochastic time horizon case, and in the stopping region of infinite time horizon case. Then V (x) = g 1 (x) < V 1 (x), contrary to (5.3). The same reasoning applies to the case z * 1 ≤ z * .
Intuitively, the item (A) of Proposition 5.1 is not surprising. Indeed, if the issuer has inside information about the terminating event, it will make the value of the game smaller as there is one additional stopping time in the set over which the issuer minimizes. Similarly, if the buyer has inside information about the terminating event, the value will be larger. In Game 3, the value is naturally in between these two extremes.
Furthermore, the exercise thresholds are ordered as one could guess from orderings of the value functions, the principal idea being: The more you know, the longer you wait.
The item (B) is also intuitively quite clear. Since g 2 ≥ 0, there is no risk of ending up on trajectory leading inevitably into negative payoff. By coupling this with the fact that Game 1 will end in finite time almost surely, the ordering V ≥ V 1 becomes evident as the less time to maximize the payoff which is bound to be nonnegative. We stress here that the positiveness of g 2 is indeed required for the inequalities V ≥ V 1 , z * ≥ z * 1 and y * ≥ y * 1 to hold. We will give a numerical example at the end of Section 6 where these inequalities are reversed for a function g 2 that takes also negative values.
5.2. Some asymptotics. In this subsection we study the limiting behavior of the optimal characteristics of Games 1 and 2 when the jump rate λ tends to infinity as well as when it tends to zero. The next proposition is our main result on this matter.
Proposition 5.2. Letx i be the greatest point such that g i (x i ) = 0. The value functions V i , i = 1, 2, and the corresponding optimal thresholds satisfy the limiting properties
Proof. We will prove the proposition only for Game 1; Game 2 is handled similarly. Let us first prove the case λ → ∞. Recall from (2.4) and (2.5) that the value of the Game 1 reads as
In light of these findings, let us show that the claimed function V ∞ is indeed the saddle point solution when λ approaches to infinity. There are three cases to be considered depending whether x ≤x 2 , x ∈ (x 2 ,x 1 ) or x ≥x 1 . (Note that since g 2 ≥ g 1 , we always havex 2 ≤x 1 .) Let x ≤x 2 . Now g 1 (x) ≤ g 3 (x) ≤ g 2 (x) ≤ 0 and so we can check straightforwardly, using (5.4) , that
. The same reasoning applies also to the cases x ∈ (x 2 ,x 1 ) and x ≥x 1 , and the claimed limiting property follows.
Next we turn our eyes on the case λ → 0. Since g It is interesting to observe that the values of Game 1 and Game 2 are the same at the limit λ → 0 and also at λ → ∞. In the limit λ → 0, this result is intuitively plausible: If the expected waiting time for the Poisson process to jump is infinite, the game will not expire unexpectedly, and as a result we get the solution of an infinite horizon game. Also the limit λ → ∞ has a natural explanation: There is no advantage of observing the jump, since both players already know that the jump will occur at the time zero.
Explicit Example with Geometric Brownian Motion
We illustrate the main results of the study in this section with an explicit example. Let the underlying diffusion be geometric Brownian motion, that is, let X be the solution of the Itô equation
where W is the Wiener process. Furthermore we assume that r > µ. Further let g 1 (x) = x − c 1 and g 2 (x) = x − c 2 and assume that c 1 > c 2 > 0, so that g 2 > g 1 . Given this setup, we find that (R r+λ g i )(x) = 6.1. Game 1 has a solution. We know that (R r+λ g + 1 )(x) satisfies the differential equation
satisfies the following conditions:
Since (R r+λ g + 1 )(0+) = ∞, we must have a 2 = 0 and since lim x→∞ (R r+λ g 
It is a matter of elementary calculation to show that
ϕ r+λ (c 1 )
Next we show that the presented setup satisfies the sufficient conditions of Theorem 3.7. Since G r g i (x) = (µ−r)x+rc i , for i = 1, 2, we find that G r g i ∈ L . Thus G r+λĝi = G r g i + λ(g + 1 − g i ) and we get
From these expressions we see that the condition (3.13) holds andx 1 > c 1 .
It follows that we can apply Theorem 3.7 and, consequently, that there exists a unique pair (z *
satisfying the necessary optimality conditions (3.12). If z * 1 < c 1 , the conditions (3.12) can be written as (to simplify notation, we write
If, on the other hand, z * 1 ≥ c 1 , conditions (3.12) take the form
Indeed, the function (R r+λ g Unfortunately solving the optimal boundaries from these equations explicitly does not seem to be possible.
Therefore we illustrate the results numerically. But before that, let us see through the solvability of Game 2.
6.2. Game 2 has a solution. Similarly to Game 1, we find that
where
In particular a 5 , a 6 < 0.
Next, we verify that the sufficient conditions in Theorem 4.5 hold. We already showed with the Game 1 that the conditions (1)- (3) hold, so it suffices to check whether the condition (4.5) holds. Recall thať
Thus
From these expressions we see that the condition (4.5) holds andx 1 > c 2 .
Again, we can apply Theorem 4.5 and there exists a unique pair (z * 2 , y * 2 ) which satisfies the necessary optimality condition (4.4). This time, if z * 2 < c 2 , the condition can be written as (to simplify notation we
If, on the other hand, z * Similarly to Game 1, we know that y * 2 >x 1 > c 2 (cf. Proposition 4.2), but we do not know whether z * 2 < c 2
or not. Therefore we have two alternative formulation of (4.4), but only one of these have a solution. Again, solving the optimal boundaries from these equations explicitly does not seem to be possible and so we are prompted to do numerical illustrations. The values V , V 1 , V 2 and V 3 are compared graphically in Figure 2 , recall the definition of V and V 3 from Section 5. In line with Proposition 5.1, we observe that the inequalities V ≥ V 1 ≥ V 3 ≥ V 2 hold in this case. We point out that V ≥ V 1 in this case even though g 2 takes also negative values. The values V , V 1 and V 2 appear to differ quite significantly from each others, which indicates that the mere existence of the expiry time and the inside information on it can have substantial impact on the optimal exercise rule. For example, if x = 4 for the given parameters, we have V (4) ≈ 1.55 and V 1 (4) ≈ 1.41 the difference being 0.14, so that V (4) is about 10% greater. However, we observe that the value V 3 does not differ much from V 2 . This means that in this example when the issuer have inside knowledge about Poisson clock (Game 2), she rarely takes advantage of this information. This, in turn, is because she exercises at the jump time T only if g 2 (X T ) < 0.
This happens rarely, since g 2 is usually positive.
In Figure 3 we illustrate the sensitivities of the exercise thresholds with respect to parameters σ and λ in Game 1 and in the infinite horizon game. We notice that the order of the lower thresholds change as σ increases. This is possible, since g 2 takes also negative values (cf. Proposition 5.1). Moreover we see that as σ increases, the continuation region gets wider. This result is in line with the literature. Furthermore, we observe that the continuation region shrinks as λ increases which is again natural in the current example. In particular, the issuer lets her exercise threshold grow towards c 2 so that she could increase her chances of exercising with negative payoff. have V (x) ≥ V 1 (x). In this subsection we show that if g 2 is allowed to be negative, then these inequalities are not necessary true, a hint of this can also be seen from which is illustrated in Figure 4 .
It is interesting to observe that the value of a random time horizon game can dominate the value of an infinite horizon game. In fact, it can be that the infinite horizon game can have the smallest value of the games considered in this paper, which seems first rather counterintuitive. However, this is all due to the "sufficient negativeness" of g 2 . Indeed, as the game will end almost surely in finite time, the issuers chances of exercising with a very negative payoff is reduced in comparison to the infinite horizon game. 
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